Beach Haven

​THE CULTURE OF AI
By Anthony Elliott
Routledge, 2019, 246 pages
​Review by Michael Beach
 
The work is subtitled “everyday life and the digital revolution.” Despite the futuristic robot image on the cover page, Elliott looks to more contemporary practical implications of AI, some of which may be scarier than the stuff of sci-fi movies.
 
Elliott does address robotics such as how technology and automation are growing in the workplace, along with some of the social and economic impacts of that trend. A less flattering look of ‘digital life’ is around our tendencies toward narcissism. Technology can inspire these tendencies. For example it may be more important to some to take online actions to increase follower counts, than to let go of the keyboard and have personal interaction with others. As a reviewer, I was certainly forced to ask myself the question about why I feel a need to publish a review on our family website about each book I read. So far I have resisted the temptation to similar things on other platforms, though I do have a public presence on several social media apps.
 
In the book, Elliott takes time to explore some of the potentially sinister aspects of AI such as automated so-called bot actions, surveillance, and even military applications. Concerns over stalking, bullying, and exploitation by the sex industry express how cyber and robotic tools can enhance the negative parts of humanity. He takes a look at each of these uses of AI and societal impacts as well. Despite the negatives, he gives similar space to positives such as increased capabilities in healthcare, remote communications, crime fighting, and democratic processes.
 
Technology and society are co-productive. Both are ever more mobile. Each cause the language and thought patterns of the other to evolve. Despite all the life enhancements tech and AI bring to modern life, I’m still an advocate of occasional unplugging. I believe it helps us be more human.

​THE PHILOSOPHER’S TOOLKIT
By Julian Baggini & Peter S. Fosl
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 284 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
The subtitle for this work is A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods. The authors have organized philosophical ideas in a dictionary-like format. The ideas are explained, along with how philosophers tend to use each idea in practical argument. Some philosophies also accompany a short history of the given idea. The authors do not approach the discipline comprehensively, rather they narrow philosophical argument to areas associated with science and technology.
 
The reader will find the work both academic for contemplation, and practical if engaging in debate. If one studies science and technology, perspective and clarity of thought behind various approaches of areas of discipline are informed by understanding major movements in scientific thought. 

​LIFE AT THE EXTREME
By Rob Mundle
Nomad Press, 2006, 152 pages
Reviewed by Michael Beach
 
The work is described by its subtitle, “The Volvo Ocean Race Round the World 2005-2006.” The Volvo race documented in the book involved teams racing on 70-foot-long sailboats through all sorts of weather and sea states.
 
Through text, pictures, graphics and maps, the reader accompanies the various racing teams and their experiences. Highs and lows happen on every boat. Equipment breaks, personalities clash, team mates come and go. Sadly, one team lost a man overboard in frigid turbulent waters. By the time they pulled him back onboard he was dead.
 
The work is a story of man-versus-man combined with man-versus-nature. Despite the competition, the humanity of man also comes out. On several occasions race teams detour in order to help competitors in trouble. Ingenuity reigns as another theme. The details in planning seem only eclipsed by the invention required when the best plans fail to predict actual experience.
 

THE MIND HAS NO SEX?
WOMEN IN THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE
By Londa Schiebinger
Harvard University Press, 1991, 355 pages
Review by Michael Beach
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Feminist Historian Challenge to the Definition of “Scientific” Activities

Despite a few noted exceptions, most women during the so-called scientific revolution period in Europe were not admitted to universities, academies or scientific societies. The degree of acceptance depended on location (Schiebinger, 1989). Italian scientific organizations in Bologna, Padua, and Rome allowed women in all sorts of roles, including positions of leadership (ibid 26). In France, involvement of women was more likely to be in salon discussions hosted by socially influential people. In fact women were often the organizers of this form of intellectual pursuit which included thought leaders of both sexes (ibid 30). German science was more economically motivated and social leaders tended to see scientific advance by women through the extension of rights under guild rules. As an artisan or business owner they could perpetuate their roles after the death of their husband (ibid 66). A noted exception was Maria Winkelmann who helped her husband create all sorts of calendars by collecting astronomical data. After his death the Berlin Academy of Sciences chose not to allow her to continue, even in a less elevated role of Assistant Calendar Maker (ibid 90).  English science seemed even less welcoming to women in any role beyond working as an assistant to a male counterpart, often her spouse. French style salons were frowned upon by English gentility (ibid 32).

Alternatives did include attempts at women’s academies, though the idea didn’t catch on so well for lack of patronage. Monasteries offered opportunities for study and contemplation, but did not tend to have a scientific focus, rather a religious one. Many women participated in science through art, recreating through drawings what could only be seen under a microscope, or preserving specimens through the injection of wax (ibid 29).

Carolyn Merchant included philosophical argument sharing views of groups concerned with metaphysics (Merchant, 1980). She spoke of the internal/external argument by sharing views of philosophers often considered as external to science, though she does not speak to individual female scientific philosophers.


Katherine Park confirms Joan Kelly’s argument of their having been no renaissance for women (Park, 2006). Kelly was more focused on women and science. Park notes Merchant offers more of “the generalist vision in the history of science” (ibid 489). Merchant depicts less about the specific effect on women scientists, and more on the metaphor of nature as female. That said, Merchant (214) does describe Hobbes’ atomistic view of equality as “meant for middle- and upper-class property-holding males” (Merchant, 1980)


Specific Examples of Institutions, Practices, and Areas of Knowledge


Despite all the challenges, women were able to make significant contributions. Scheibinger’s work shares examples through the entire book.  Margaret Cavendish married into a noble network of scholars. She worked primarily in isolation from other women, but became a thought leader in the atomistic philosophy. She lauded occasional attacks on rationalists and empiricists of her day. Emilie du Chatelet worked in close contact with Voltaire. Through him she was able to intermingle with many Newtonians of her day. She was able to use her social position of privilege to intermingle with the scholarly. Maria Sibylla Merian combined her artistic talents with her husband to create businesses. She gained notoriety through creating and selling art depicting nature of all scales. Maria Winkelmann became an astronomer by learning first from her father, later largely through partnership with her second husband Gottfried Kirch (Schiebinger, 1989). Though her major work was originally published by Kirch under his name, in a later publishing he gave Winkelmann credit (ibid 85).


Mainstream Scientific Culture Described as “Masculine” Rather Than “Gender-neutral”


Carolyn Merchant speaks to the evolution of nature from mother/womb, to untamed woman to be ‘penetrated’ in order to understand it, to the self-revealing woman, then finally to a non-woman mechanical cosmos (Merchant, 1980). These definitions came from a male perspective in the attempt to understand nature through the cultural definitions of womanhood. However Merchant only mentions one woman, Margaret Cavendish (ibid 206). She is incidentally depicted as one of a group, the rest are men, of English Royalist emigres in France with whom Thomas Hobbes associates himself while living there. The focus of the section is really on Hobbes’ mechanistic view of the cosmos and nature.


The Mechanism of Hobbes shows a default assumption of paternalism. Merchant shows how atomism would mean that all nature is the same, or equal, since everything is a result of atoms in motion. This even included the “human soul, will, brain, and appetites” (ibid 205). Despite the equality this stand should define, yet in Leviathan Hobbes describes a family in terms of a father, children and servants. Mother is not mentioned (ibid 214). This social depiction comes despite the argument that a child’s mother is always known, but the father is only known by the confession of the mother.
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One way Schiebinger depicts the masculinization of science is to share how Kant describes the difference between the sexes through how each understands (Schiebinger, 1989). “Kant associated woman’s ‘beautiful understanding’ not with science, but with feeling.” He further argues women come to their philosophy “not to reason, but to sense” (ibid 271).
BibliographyMerchant, C. (1980). The Death of Nature. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Park, K. (2006). Women, Gender, and Utopia. FOCUS - ISIS, 487- 495.
Schiebinger, L. (1989). The Mind has no Sex? London: Harvard University Press.

KILLING LINCOLN
By Bill O’Reilly and Martin Dugard
St. Martin’s Griffin, 2011, 324 pages
Review by Michael Beach
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This is one in a series of similar books by this author duo. Each book looks at the assassination, or attempted assassination, of some famous person. The book is written as a narrative story, but pulls on the works of many historians. The first part of the book concentrates on the ending battles and scenes of the American Civil War. Interactions of generals and troops north and south, as well as Lincoln’s actions shed light on an important part of our history. John Wilks Booth and his fellow conspirators are addressed only lightly in the first half of the chapters. When they are spoken of the depictions at times relate to the war and its leading figures, other times their lives seem to have little to do with larger historical events.
 
The second part of the book shifts and is almost the opposite of the fist. The authors now focus now shines brightly mostly on the conspiracy and its participants. Government and military leaders, including Lincoln, are still mentioned, but more from how their actions are noted and interpreted by the assassination ring.
 
Like many concentrated histories, many lesser-known characters are brought to light. It seems surprising to hear some of the important roles played by people you never learn about in formal history classes growing up. These stories make the history less sterile, more human, and more believable. This certainly was a sad chapter in human history, not just because of the presidential murder, but also to see how the war effected the psyche of Americans on both sides. All involved saw their deeds as necessary evils, but some were really evil. Personal motivation is at the heart of what makes one willing to sacrifice, as opposed to those who use the same language in their willingness to sacrifice others for personal benefit.
 
I don’t know how much of this book is accurate. It seems as likely true as any other history I’ve read. My personal feelings on history, or even documented contemporary events, is that they are all colored by the original sources. Original sources are also colored by those who create them. My guess is this book represents a reasonable proximity to what actually happened. It says a lot about both the highest and lowest of human motivation and choice. 

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​REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING
By Ian Hacking
Cambridge University Press, 1983, 287 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
In this work, Hacking reviews philosophical thought related to science and technology from the perspective of how scientific and technological ideas do or don’t represent reality. He also shows argument around scientific use of ideas and technology to create reality (intervening). Aside from reviewing the main arguments and philosophers involved on the topics he often interjects his own stands on the issues.
 
An example of a key philosophical debate is eluded to in a quote by Lakatos. His reading of Popper on knowledge growth stated simply is, “people propose, nature disposes” (114).
 
Hacking makes a number of comparisons between the philosophical perspectives of Lakatos and others such as Popper, Kuhn, Putnam, and Kant. The key phase is one focus, specifically on how (and if) science progresses. For Lakatos, successive research either progresses a theory, or degenerates it (117). In this way, theories are bolstered or unsupported by empiricist efforts.
 
Some direct comparison between Kuhn and Putnam allows Hacking to clarify. For instance, while Kuhn speaks of scientific revolution, Putnam is focused more on evolution in terms of knowledge growth through rationality (111). Putnam further muddies the knowledge-growth question through the concepts of reference and extension. One of his arguments, for example, is that a given reference may be understood differently by different people, making the extension, including knowledge growth though experiment, essentially impossible (101). If one accepts this premise, then proposals by people (theories) are not universally understood, nor the disposition of nature as neither the proposition nor the disposition are held in common among scientists.
 
Putnam’s struggle is with meaning. Hacking denotes that a reference is the meaning, or thing, represented by the word. Sense is more like the connotative understanding of the thing, the reference in question (75). If Putnam questions one’s ability to concur with others on either reference or sense, then his questioning of knowledge growth is understandable. The scientific world seems to get around the difference through the practice of dubbing. Where Lakatos would argue that knowledge growth can only be understood in retrospect (118), Hacking argues in favor of dubbing “new natural kinds” which are “often the result of initial speculations which are gradually articulated into theory and experiment” (82).
 
Ian Hacking’s work shows a mixed message claiming varying schools of scientific philosophy share common ground, yet differ in fundamental ways, stating how such point-by-point opposition between philosophers only means there is ‘underlying agreement’.
 
By introduction, Hacking makes a case for ‘common ground’.  He shares seven areas where he believes Carnap and Popper, and by extension philosophers of science in general, tend to agree (5). Natural science is the best rational thought. Distinction exists between observation and theory. Knowledge is cumulative. Science has a deductive structure. Science depends on precise language. Unity of science methodology exists in each discipline. Finally, the context of justification differs from the context of discovery.
 
Despite these unifying assertions, pretty much all the rest of the reading shows an evolution, along with examples of fundamental change of thought. For example, Hacking’s first positivist instinct refers to falsifiability as a ‘variant’ of verification (41), yet early in his work (3) he refers to the divided image of Carnap and Popper as betraying a ‘deeper’ difference. It seems difficult to justify such ‘deeper difference’ with simply being ‘variant’. Difference is variable, on a subjective scale. Qualifying words expose subjective opinion. At times Hacking depicts difference as minor, other times as significant.
 
Hacking describes schools of thought within his own form of structure; realism vs anti-realism, causal vs anti-causal, theoretical entities vs anti-theoretical entities, and the list continues. A specific example referred to earlier was the divided image of Carnap and Popper. Carnap was in favor of science as verifiable. By this he claimed metaphysics is not science, inductive reasoning should be employed, and there are important meanings in language. Popper, on the other hand, stood for science as falsifiable. By this he argued metaphysics leads to science, deductive reasoning should be employed, and calling meanings and language only ‘scholastic’ (4).
 
Difference can be understood subjectively by degrees. Hacking seems simultaneously to both emphasize and downplay difference. Readers could easily see downplayed example differences as significant.
 
Among the topics around speculation and experimentation I found the bridging concept of calculation particularly important. A calculation is a form of modeling. Hacking referenced many ideas of his own and others about meanings of speculation (theory) and experimentation (observation). However, until he addressed the bridging aspect of calculation in the speculation-calculation-experimentation framework, the two seemed somewhat independent. In fact, many of Hacking’s reference philosophers argued specifically a lack of connection between theory and empirical data.
 
This framework also answered a longstanding question for me. So often in science classes teachers would introduce the idea of constants. These constants were usually attached to the name of a scientist who ‘discovered’ or ‘introduced’ the constant. They never were explained. We were just taught how to incorporate a specific constant into a formula to obtain the answer to a specific scientific process. Hacking explains how a calculation comes about from a need to explain a given observation or experimental data set (artifact, phenomenon). Adding a constant to make a calculation consistently approximate the expected outcome allows science to adopt a theory that adheres to accepted scientific principles. The beauty of such a bridging approach is it also allows for change in both theory and experiment without shifting the calculation. The same calculation can be used to support different theories or outcomes.
 
The resulting approximation becomes yet another central argument Hacking spends considerable time discussing. If a formula and data from empirical observation consistently approximate theoretical prediction, is that bringing us any closer to truth, or just substantiating a theory that purports to stand for truth? Perhaps the substantiation is merely for a given system generally accepted by the larger scientific community at the time of the speculation-calculation-experimentation linkage.

​NOTRE DAME DE PARIS
By Victor Marie Hugo
PF Collier & Son Company, 1917, 531 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
Many have heard of this work as The Hunchback of Notre Dame. The story is timeless, and nothing like any of the movies I’ve ever seen on the topic. Quasimodo is the protagonist who watches over Esmeralda, protecting her from the evil priest, Claude Frollo. Hugo originally published the 15th century story in 1829. This publication is in one volume of a series called The Harvard Classics Shelf of Fiction.
 
The story has a fairly pessimistic outlook on humanity. About the only two people who have positive motivations are Quasimodo and Esmeralda. Despite their motivations, their decisions seem just as foolhardy, or even destructive, as every other character in the story. Judgments by every character are always ill-informed, and influenced by personal preference, or personal benefit. In the end just about every character dies under unnecessary circumstances, including Quasimodo and Esmeralda. The ends of each character come by some combination of poor decisions of their own and others.

For example, Esmeralda’s mother has her daughter stolen from her as an infant. She repents of her promiscuous life, and removes herself to suffering in a convent cell. Eventually she sees Esmeralda from time to time through her cell window and curses the girl out of anger at the gypsies whom she blames for taking her child. Assuming Esmeralda to just be another gypsy and not suspecting her to be her own daughter, she reviles Esmeralda every time she sees her. When the two are reunited and the truth exposed near the end of the story, the mother holds her too long in her cell and is unsuccessful at keeping the king’s guard from capturing the girl. Esmeralda was accused and convicted in the death of her love, Pheobus, who is not dead, but only wounded. His attacker was not Esmeralda, but Claude Frollo. Claude continues to offer Esmeralda freedom if she will consent to marry him. She always refuses. Meanwhile, Phoebus avoids exposure around Esmeralda because despite taking her as a mistress for a few months, he remains betrothed to another and in the end abandons Esmeralda to the gallows.
 
Quasimodo it not much better in his judgments. He seeks to protect Esmeralda within Notre Dame. Because of his deafness, when the gypsies storm the cathedral to free her, and steal some of the riches within, he mistakes their attack as an attempt to kill Esmeralda. In his efforts at defending her he kills many of them from the towers above.
 
I found the story intriguing. It was hard not to follow to see the outcomes. Aside from that there was some disappointment in the ultimate resolution. Only one character seems to have escaped unscathed despite some of his own poor judgement, Pierre Gringoire. He is a failed playwright at the beginning. When he takes refuge with the gypsies and is almost executed by them, Esmeralda frees him by marrying him. She does not actually intend to honor the marriage in any way, but rather pines for Phoebus. She never gives herself to Gringoire, but does give herself unvirtuously to Phoebus leading to the attempted murder by Frollo, and the subsequent hanging of Esmeralda. Gringoire does help Esmeralda temporarily escape the gallows by cooperating with Frollo. He even helps her get to her mother, but he ultimately only manages to save Esmeralda’s goat. The two of them seem to be the only survivors among all the characters.
 
If the reader is hoping for hopeful outcomes, don’t read the story. If the reader is interested in the literary perspectives of French writers of the 19th century, then this work is surely a prime exemplar.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
By Samir Okasha
Oxford University Press, 2016, 140 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
The title is very descriptive of the content. The book is one in a long series of ‘very short introductions’ published by Oxford. In an earlier similar review I looked at Simon Critchley’s version of a related topic. One of the major themes of his work was the split between the analytical and continental schools of scientific philosophy. Okasha takes up many themes. I’ll focus here one theme, the continuum between scientism and obscurantism, as an example of unresolved issues within the larger philosophical community. These continuum extremes seem at least partially aligned with analytic and continental philosophies respectively. The issues are central and remain unresolved.
 
Scientism is a belief that only science and the scientific method can expose truth. This approach leads to ignoring information not always testable, yet pertinent, such as the moral application of knowledge. Philosophical outcomes such as the discouragement of humanity through a belief in meaninglessness can follow. Supporters of scientism consider such a concern a non-issue. This outcome might be a logical extension of the arguments of Rudolf Carnap.

Obscurantism emphasizes thought over experiment which can lead to questioning the importance of science. Such questioning encourages speculation with less emphasis on searching out supportive facts. Supporting logic of this approach are a possible extension of the views expressed by Martin Heidegger.

Critchley attempted to seek some balance along the continuum “by defending a notion of phenomenology that aims to undermine scientism without falling into obscurantism” (Critchley 113). He goes on to explain how pre-theoretical experience, or pre-science, is a “reflection upon what precedes reflection.” Perhaps Okasha’s review of the arbitrariness of species classification seeks a similar balance. He also asks the question if science is value-free (Okasha 123). He notes how specialization can make it difficult to move from the micro to the macro.

Philosophical camps still line up along differing points in this continuum, including the absolutes. Though these readings share perspectives, the path to resolution, if there is one, seems foggy at best.
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THE ARABIAN NIGHTS, VOL 3
Translated By Malcolm C. Lyans
Penguin Books, 2008, 855 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
This is the third and final volume of the overall compendium. I reviewed the earlier volumes in previous editions of the BHP. The author is not known. The overarching thread is that each night Shahrazad tells a story to her husband the king. She doesn’t quite finish the story so he insists she continue it the next day. She does, but breaks into another, and the pattern goes on night after night. She tells these stories in order to dissuade the king from killing her in the morning. This threat comes because his original wife was unfaithful to him and he killed her. He then married a different woman each night and had her killed the next day because he believed all women to be unfaithful. By weaving her stories, Shahrazad manages to stay alive each consecutive day.

The result is essentially a book of short stories. The mix of stories include mystical, religious, historical, romantic, adventurous, and the like. They often depict interactions between Muslims and Christians as told from the Muslim perspective.

The stories tend to be prejudicial against non-Muslim, non-Arabic people, and at times depicts them in a very negative light. There are love scenes described that I wouldn’t describe as pornographic or erotic, but perhaps they are not suited for young readers.

Some nights include several stories at once. Some stories stretch across multiple nights. Often there are stories wrapped in stories three or four layers deep. For instance a character in a story tells a story to another character. Within that story the pattern follows of characters telling stories. It could take many nights to conclude the buried stories and finally return to the conclusion of the highest level story. The results can be confusing if one does not follow closely. This volume covers from night 720 through night 1001. The king has his faith restored and does not kill Shahrazad, but they live a Hollywood-like happy ending.

​This publication also includes the tale of Aladdin. This history appears after the Arabian Nights portion and serves as an add-on.  This original story is nothing like those I’ve seen in the movies over the years. Some of the characters carry the names made famous in the film versions, a few of the interactions among some characters are similar, but not much else seems the same. Aladdin gets the princess in the end, but not without some trickery, and a little subterfuge in revenge for similar acts on the part of the king. For instance, after the king betroths Aladdin to his daughter, he later does the same with the son of the vazir. Aladdin breaks up the wedding bed through magic from one of several gin he has access to.
 

MICHAEL POLANYI AND HIS GENERATION
By Mary Jo Nye
University of Chicago Press, 2011, 405 pages
​Review by Michael Beach
 
Through the personal history of Michael Polanyi, Mary Jo Nye helps readers through the growth of ideas around how science is influenced by society. The subtitle helps to understand this; ‘Origins of the Social Construction of Science.’

The idea of community relates to groups of people, and how people within the group influence each other. Nye, through Polanyi, makes the case for ‘social construction’. Social implies community. Construction implies group influence. Before reviewing Polanyi’s theoretical loss to Langmuir on the Nernst heat problem, Nye paraphrases Polanyi’s views on the outcomes. She depicts his views as a “controversial description of science as a community of dogmatic traditions and social practices rather than a march of revolutionary ideas and individual genius” (Nye 85).

The word community shares the word root of communication, which implies interaction. In the scientific world, individuals or groups of scientists communicate ideas through formal and informal methods. The community reflects back acceptance or non-acceptance (sometimes both) equally through formal and informal methods.

Chapter 3 in particular shows some of the downs in the up-and-down scientific career of Polanyi. It is probably fair to say he was surrounded by, and was part of, a community of some of the leading minds in chemistry and physics of his day, and of all time. The comment and reflection of that community not only influenced success or failure of his career personally, but also determined future directions of the pursuit of scientific knowledge.

A key example Nye gives is acceptance of Langmuir’s ideas of covalent and electrovalent polar and non-polar bonds over Polanyi’s adsorption theory. Several times she quotes Polanyi as he points to comments by Einstein, Nernst and others indicating that adsorption did not fit with new electron theories (Nye 109). This difficulty held true even given later “consistency of evidence with his new theory” (ibid). The community put more stock in ideas that supported the more recently accepted electron theories almost exclusively. Such was the power of scientific community.

Michael Polanyi’s work with Henry Eyring regarding a temporary transition state of chemical reactions might be seen as a foreshadow of his own transition state as he changed focus from chemistry, to economics and politics, finally settling on the philosophy of science.

The position taken by Polanyi and Erying defines the semi-empirical method in which experience is considered along with mathematical formulaic calculation. An element of probability is included in defining chemical interaction. Based on empirical experimentation, they posited when joining one chemical to a compound of two, the result is a different compound and chemical. They also asserted that during the transition process there is a temporary state in which a single compound composed of all three chemicals exists.

During his time in Budapest and Berlin, Polanyi was focused primarily on chemistry, but there was always some smaller amount of his time in which he considered, and wrote about, economics and politics. After moving to Manchester, the balance of his attention shifted the other way. Others in the chemistry department complained about this attention shift. He put less and less time into the daily lab effort. He even used a concocted chemical apparatus of a vacuum-containing glass to make a graphic explanation of his ideas on Keynesian economics (Nye 159).

Nye argues that Polanyi’s economic preoccupation was a “bridge to his sociologically inflected philosophy of science” (Nye 176). If this ‘bridge’ idea is true, then the original state might be thought of as science, since chemistry is a branch of science. It could be argued that both economics and politics have sociological and philosophical foundations. The mix of all of these areas of contemplation led to the final state of his new ‘intellectual compound’ within the discipline of the philosophy of science. During his 'transitory state', Polanyi was not fully based in science nor the social sciences, but some shifting level of each. The resultant ‘compound’ of the philosophy of science was not the same as the beginning ‘substance’ of science nor the transitory ‘compound’ of science, economics and politics.
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