PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
By Samir Okasha
Oxford University Press, 2016, 140 pages
Review by Michael Beach
The title is very descriptive of the content. The book is one in a long series of ‘very short introductions’ published by Oxford. In an earlier similar review I looked at Simon Critchley’s version of a related topic. One of the major themes of his work was the split between the analytical and continental schools of scientific philosophy. Okasha takes up many themes. I’ll focus here one theme, the continuum between scientism and obscurantism, as an example of unresolved issues within the larger philosophical community. These continuum extremes seem at least partially aligned with analytic and continental philosophies respectively. The issues are central and remain unresolved.
Scientism is a belief that only science and the scientific method can expose truth. This approach leads to ignoring information not always testable, yet pertinent, such as the moral application of knowledge. Philosophical outcomes such as the discouragement of humanity through a belief in meaninglessness can follow. Supporters of scientism consider such a concern a non-issue. This outcome might be a logical extension of the arguments of Rudolf Carnap.
Obscurantism emphasizes thought over experiment which can lead to questioning the importance of science. Such questioning encourages speculation with less emphasis on searching out supportive facts. Supporting logic of this approach are a possible extension of the views expressed by Martin Heidegger.
Critchley attempted to seek some balance along the continuum “by defending a notion of phenomenology that aims to undermine scientism without falling into obscurantism” (Critchley 113). He goes on to explain how pre-theoretical experience, or pre-science, is a “reflection upon what precedes reflection.” Perhaps Okasha’s review of the arbitrariness of species classification seeks a similar balance. He also asks the question if science is value-free (Okasha 123). He notes how specialization can make it difficult to move from the micro to the macro.
Philosophical camps still line up along differing points in this continuum, including the absolutes. Though these readings share perspectives, the path to resolution, if there is one, seems foggy at best.
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
By Samir Okasha
Oxford University Press, 2016, 140 pages
Review by Michael Beach
The title is very descriptive of the content. The book is one in a long series of ‘very short introductions’ published by Oxford. In an earlier similar review I looked at Simon Critchley’s version of a related topic. One of the major themes of his work was the split between the analytical and continental schools of scientific philosophy. Okasha takes up many themes. I’ll focus here one theme, the continuum between scientism and obscurantism, as an example of unresolved issues within the larger philosophical community. These continuum extremes seem at least partially aligned with analytic and continental philosophies respectively. The issues are central and remain unresolved.
Scientism is a belief that only science and the scientific method can expose truth. This approach leads to ignoring information not always testable, yet pertinent, such as the moral application of knowledge. Philosophical outcomes such as the discouragement of humanity through a belief in meaninglessness can follow. Supporters of scientism consider such a concern a non-issue. This outcome might be a logical extension of the arguments of Rudolf Carnap.
Obscurantism emphasizes thought over experiment which can lead to questioning the importance of science. Such questioning encourages speculation with less emphasis on searching out supportive facts. Supporting logic of this approach are a possible extension of the views expressed by Martin Heidegger.
Critchley attempted to seek some balance along the continuum “by defending a notion of phenomenology that aims to undermine scientism without falling into obscurantism” (Critchley 113). He goes on to explain how pre-theoretical experience, or pre-science, is a “reflection upon what precedes reflection.” Perhaps Okasha’s review of the arbitrariness of species classification seeks a similar balance. He also asks the question if science is value-free (Okasha 123). He notes how specialization can make it difficult to move from the micro to the macro.
Philosophical camps still line up along differing points in this continuum, including the absolutes. Though these readings share perspectives, the path to resolution, if there is one, seems foggy at best.
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