Beach Haven

Bibliography
​Bloor, David. 1991. Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
This work by David Bloor repasses the strong program of sociology and the creation of knowledge. He was a proponent of a framework called the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The strong program suggests that technological advancements are primarily a function of social factors. The alternative, the weak program, doesn’t go so far, but looks at failed technologies and asserts social factors leading to their demise. After making a number of SSK arguments, Bloor looks at mathematics as an example. From the wisdom of the crowds example of ox-weight estimation, to the arguments against crow-sourcing for understanding the world, Bloor shares chapters on ‘naturalistic’ math followed by asking if there can be ‘alternative’ math.

For Bloor, and other proponents of SSK, naturalistic views are partial and don’t go far enough. Over time, other philosophers of science have pointed to Bloor’s own argument vulnerabilities in more or less ignoring technological and scientific effects on society. He admits there is some influence, but describes the influence seemingly like a form of feedback, but not so much as a changing factor. SSK leans away from technological determinism as have many other philosophical frameworks. Perhaps David Bloor and the school of SSK takes that leaning away too far. One argument he makes relates to symmetry. In this specific definition, all ideas should be approach as having equal weight until proven different. He argues “Our everyday attitudes are practical and evaluative, and evaluations are by their nature asymmetrical” (Bloor 1991, 175). Bloor shares examples of other philosophers inducing other forms of symmetry. Bloor’s position of practicality and ‘common sense’ is part of his justification of asymmetry between social influence on technology as opposed to technological influence on society. 
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Bibliography
​Lampland, Martha, and Susan Leigh Star, . 2009. Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
 
Reviewed by Michael Beach

Convention is the word of this book. The various chapter authors consider different standards of measurement we tend to take for granted. How did we choose one length, or weight, or electrical measurement over another? In fact, standards are still not really standard. Ask anyone who totes along an electrical plug converter when they travel internationally.

One area I found surprising is the chapter by Steven Epstein that relates to the ‘standard human’. I had not idea, but when dealing with medical research or treatment the world of health has set categories of humans. In reality, we are each different and are part of a mix and continuum of humanity, each with unique DNA. No one prognosis or treatment is best for all, so the medical community sort of does it work considering clumps of humans to get the symptoms and treatments mostly right most of the time.

There are a few standards examples reviewed from my profession, including metadata and ASCII definitions. One of the jokes in the industry of communications technology is that standards are so helpful because there are so many to choose from. The implication being that with so many different standards to select from, there really isn’t a ‘standard’.
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Bibliography
​Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Review by Michael Beach

Bruno Latour, among other things, was a French sociologist of science. This specific work was originally published in French in 1991. In the field of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) he is among the canonical authors. Depending on one’s philosophical bent, society, at least western society, finds itself in either a modernist or post-modernist world. The basic argument of Latour, as the title hints, is that neither is true. We are not modern in the sociological sense, and having never been so, we are also not post-modern.

Latour shares many definitions that have surfaced in explaining modernism. Latour points to the pattern in such definitions as comparative between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’. In this approach there is a winner and loser as modern supplants ancient. He argues, however, such arguments don’t reveal whether the new defeats the old or if it just brings past revolution “to fruition” (Latour 1993, 10). One aim of this work is to take on “the task of studying scientists and politicians in tandem since no central vantage point has seemed to exist” (Latour 1993, 13). Modernism can be looked at in many ways. Latour considers art, architecture, and scientific process among others. For Latour, modernism creates a dividing line between “the natural world and the social world” (Ibid.).

In this work, the author examines a famous debate between ‘natural philosophers’ such as Thomas Hobbes, and the ‘empiricists’ like Robert Boyle. The argument puts Hobbes on one side in which the world is defined through thought experiment and the theoretical. On the other side, Boyles defines science as finding truth about the natural world through planned experiments. At the heart of the debate is which brings us closer to truth. Modernism in science looks to support empiricism over philosophy. For Latour, that leaves out the influence that each has on each other. For example, experiments are formulated and carried out based on theories and assumptions constructed over time, and theories and assumptions are shaped by former experiments.

Bruno Latour is arguing for symmetry over asymmetry. “When Georges Canguilhem distinguishes scientific ideologies from true sciences, he asserts not only that it is impossible to study Darwin – the scientist – and Diderot – the ideologue – in the same terms, but that it must be impossible to lump them together” (Latour 1993, 92). Latour then argues for symmetry between the two approaches arguing that they are inextricably connected.  On page 135 is a table arguing what parts of both modernist and post-modernist approaches should be maintained, and which rejected, in order to describe a symmetrical approach that Latour argues that is more reflective of how the social and the scientific actually interact with each other to form our current scientific and technologically influenced world.
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References
​Hess, David J. 2016. Undone Science: Social Movements, Mobilized Publics, and Industrial Transitions. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.

Review by Michael Beach

In this work, David J. Hess looks at controversial issues that involve “complex scientific and technological issues that can provoke sharp divisions in public opinion” (Hess 2016, 1). As a way to examine the role of scientific and technological expertise Hess includes specific topics to include climate change, industrial pollution, nanomaterials, technologies of surveillance, and products of molecular biology. It’s safe to say these topics are both ongoing and controversial. Although he looks at the political issues themselves, the point of the work is to look at epistemological perspectives by and about scientists and technologists involved in these specific focus areas.

One example of an area Hess examines is depicted in the chapter 3 title; “The Politics of Meaning: From Frames to Design Conflicts” (Hess 2016, 79). The controversial topics noted above are not the focus of this chapter so much as the setting. The focus is on how researchers tend to frame the arguments and issues that need attention, and the cultural factors that influence their analysis. How does one create an analysis (breaking down ideas into parts) then move towards a meaningful synthesis (understanding the way the parts interact)? Designing an approach to both analysis and synthesis is where many human factors can cause variation in approach that also cause variation in artifacts produced in the process. This variable process is what causes many of us who are not experts in a given controversial topic such as climate change to put stock in one political position or another using ‘science’ as one of our arguments in favor of a given position. An example Hess shares relates to high emissions by buses. The bus depots that have the highest pollution emission concentrations tend to be in lower-income parts of cities. He gives examples of studies conducted in specific cities that linked income with bus depot locations. These studies further linked low-income neighborhoods with predominantly African American residents. Yet, one needs to examine the details about bus usage, historical demographic changes in neighborhoods, and other similar factors. “More generally, the analysis of race and design in the urban transit system suggest a need for methodological caution” (Hess 2016, 91). Studies have often suffered criticism in the process of going from the general the specific (analysis), then applying the specific to the general (synthesis). Humans are making decisions all along the process of what to examine and what to ignore in collecting data. Then humans are making decisions all along the process of which variables and data are relevant and which are not. In the language of statistical analysis, what information is statistically significant, and how does one define statistically significant? How much variability in data is acceptable to call something ‘significant’? The subjectivity is ultimately what has led to an erosion of confidence by some in scientific expertise. 
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References
Ezrahi, Yaron. 1990. The Descent of Icarus: Sceince and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

​Review by Michael Beach

The author has looked at the cross-section of science and politics since the 1960s. In this work, Yaron Ezrahi considers the role of scientific expertise in the policy process within modern ‘liberal-democratic’ states. He shares examples of the ascension of science as an authoritative voice in coming to ‘objective’ conclusions. Over time, other factors came to have as much or more influence in policy. Since experts of similar credential don’t always agree, and some change their perspective over time, public policy makers have come to view expertise as one area of consideration when forming public policy, not so much as the area of consideration. The lowering of scientific authority from preeminence to that of one more voice of many is its descension. Science is more generally understood to have both objective and subjective components, often with ‘dueling experts’ on opposite sides of a policy question.

Ezrahi examines both political process and its relationship with scientific process. The work is divided into three sections. The first examines the political functions of science. It is followed by a look at dilemmas that arise between private persons and public actions. This includes those who act as scientific experts, but also those who create policy, and the rest of us who vote in a democratic society. The final section takes deep dive into effects caused by the privatization of science in the United States specifically.

One interesting thread for me as a reader was the author’s look at machines as a metaphor in scientific and policy processes. For example, machines can be viewed as helpful and positive, or out of control. In the first, we have influence and benefit from mechanistic processes. They create a fair and equal environment. In the second, those not directly inside the machine are powerless and fall victim to its seemingly mindless path. Where one falls in the machine metaphor as benevolent or apocalyptic, depends a great deal on the specific country or culture with which one is surrounded. 
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Bibliography
​Daston, Lorraine, and Gregg Mitman, . 2005. Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Antrhopomorphism. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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This is a collection of articles (chapters) from multiple authors. Each chapter focuses on some aspect of how humans project themselves onto animals. For example, many fairy tales and Saturday morning cartoon characters include animals that talk and feel like humans. Some authors do the opposite, such as the chapter by Wendy Doniger in which she explores the idea that humans can be more bestial than beasts. Paul S. White looks at the use of animals in scientific experimentation during the age of Victorian Britain.

The list goes on. Authors tackle topics including evolutionary biology, psychology, human-pet relationships, digital beasts, media, politics, and conversation. Several chapters look into human-animal relationships from a scientific perspective, either their use in science, or scientific evaluation of the human in some connected way. These chapters are the main motivation for my reading the book as a part of my PhD program, but the rest of the perspectives are worth the read.

One example of a specific approach includes a study of “The Family that Live with Elephants” (Daston and Mitman 2005, 177). In this section, Gregg Mitman considers communications between the elephants and the human family that cares for them. The human father and daughter in particular discuss actions and noises the pachyderms make to express ideas. The humans ponder how subjective the elephant thoughts are, and not just simple one-word ideas. In a discussion about objective and subjective human evaluation of elephant language, the daughter eventually asserts, “But it’s HUMAN and subjective. They decide which bits of animal behavior to be objective about by consulting human subjective experience. Didn’t you say that anthropomorphism is a bad thing?” To which her father answers, “Yes – but they do try to be not human” (Ibid.).
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Bibliography
​Pickering, A. (1995). The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
 
Andrew Pickering takes a look at science as a practical work. While there are many philosophical arguments abounding in regards to science in theory, he examines social forces that shape and are shaped by the processes in scientific decision making.

Pickering offers some clarification around the word ‘mangle’. He realizes that this has a different meaning in different places. In America, for example, he notes that the word refers to completely messing something up from the original intention of the thing in question. In his sense mangle means, “practice, understood as the work of cultural extension” (original emphasis) (Pickering, 1995, p. 3). He equates ‘mangle’ with ‘change’. To Pickering, the practice of science is to change it from the theoretical to the real.

He uses some examples to show how process and outcomes don’t always follow original assumptions. One example includes experimentation using a bubble chamber. It includes “the extension of the mechanic field of science, specifically of the development of the bubble chamber as an instrument for experimental research in elementary-particle physics” (Pickering, 1995, p. 37). Pickering shares the history of decisions it took to get to a working model, and the modification of how ‘working’ was eventually defined. Since the chamber ultimately did not create the exact vacuum conceived, the vacuum it did achieve served to define what a bubble chamber is.

Other examples in the book include “hunting the quark,” “constructing quaternions,” and “numerically controlled machine tools.” Each comes with its own history of conception through realization with social compromises along the way. Finally, Pickering finishes with two chapters on conceptual arguments about the kinds of influences and ways to perhaps embrace or reconstruct them. In Chapter 6 for example, he puts some focus on scientific norms as espoused by Robert Merton which have been argued about since their inception. Pickering considers these norms (or any others) as ‘articulations’. 
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Bibliography
Bijker, W. E. (1995). Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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Wiebe Bijker uses three specific technology examples to explore how social factors affect technical outcomes. “The stories we tell about technology reflect and can also affect our understanding of the place of technology in our lives and our society” (Bijker, 1995, p. 1). Although this quote may sound as if Bijker is arguing along a co-constructive line, yet throughout the book it’s clear that he asserts that social influence on technology is the primary force.

The bicycle chapter looks at the evolution of how they were designed and constructed. The perceptions evolved from the large bikes that were for daring young men who at times suffered the odd broken bone or two. Such perception led to the eventual production of the ‘safety bike’ that looks ever more like the bikes we typically ride today. By changing front and rear tire size, adding breaks, making seats wider, and other modifications, the community of bicycle riders expanded to include older people and women.

Bakelite is a substance that I became very familiar with while serving in the US Navy. Pretty much every placard on the ship I served on were made of it. Bakelite is an early form of plastic created and modified over time by the company formed by Leo Henricus Arthur Baekeland. Through all sorts of chemical combinations and varying heating temperature and bake timing, he was able to form a number of plastics of different flexibility and strength. The hard relatively thin version seemed to gain the biggest use of Bakelite. Eventually this form of plastic was supplanted by more modern forms that require less toxic waste to create. Newer plastic is also less expensive to make. Nonetheless, for the better part of a century many needs formerly provided by less durable materials, or those more metallic-based and subject to oxidation, were replaced by this early form of plastic.

Turning to bulbs, Bijker looks at the creation of the electric florescent light. What eventually became the long tubes we have all come to know, the approach was thought to fill the need of longer lasting bulbs that could light larger areas than the small incandescent. Industrial facilities in particular had difficulty fully lighting large factory spaces with small incandescent bulbs, and larger spotlights required more frequent replacement. This example specifically addresses not only social influence on invention, but even organized social effort to standardize the eventual technology. Bijker shares several examples of groups of users and bulb manufacturers who even held conferences in an effort to agree on gases used, electrical voltage standards, and the like.

Wiebe Bijker makes the argument for a ‘constructionist analysis’ (p. 280). “Such an analysis stresses the malleability of technology, the possibility for choice, the basic insight that things could have been otherwise” (author’s emphasis) (Ibid.). Bijker immediately notes that not all technological change is so malleable. Later sociologists of technology would take this assumption of social preeminence in the relationship between technology and society to a more level two-way influence. That conception of a level playing field is known as co-construction.
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Bibliography
​Golinski, J. (2005). Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
 
Jan Golinski looks to shed some light on historical views of constructivism in science. Constructivists argue that scientific facts are not discovered but are created based on social factors affecting individual scientists and the greater scientific community. After essays on issues raised by constructionism and some of the general related ideas, he clarifies typical arguments concerning social identity for scientists. For example, how they view themselves, how their self-view is disciplined among members of larger scientific community, and who is even a part of that community.

Golinski continues along the line of examining the workplaces of scientists, how they are organized and funded. He refers to scientific laboratories as ‘places of production’ of knowledge. Clearly that is different than how many scientists view labs as places of discovery. He spends a whole chapter viewing ideas of Ian Hacking, a scientific philosopher whose works I’ve read a few of. Hacking devoted a great deal of study on the ideas of intervening with nature and representing the outcomes of those interventions. For example, is the atomic model of electrons spinning around a neutron a representation of what an atom actually looks like, or just a way to explain the measured phenomena? Do chemical substances in nature actually interact with each other the way they do in a lab where specific components are isolated from each other before being mixed in unnatural rations? Constructivists argue that without human intervention such behavior is not natural. They also argue that human representation (such as using mathematics) only partially describes the intervening version and not natural processes.

“The issue of narrative, with its connection to the moral meaning of historical discourse, is an important one to consider in the light of constructivist approaches to the history of science” (Golinski, 2005, p. 187). Golinski is looking at the history of constructivism in science as well as the history of the history of constructivism in science. 
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Bibliography
​Frickel, S., & Moore, K. (Eds.). (2006). The New Political Sociology of Science: Institutions, Networks, and Power. London: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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Like many academic books, this work is a compilation of chapters written by various authors who share focus points of the title topic. Each chapter is grouped with others under three main topics: the commercialization of science; science and social movements; and science and the regulatory state. The editors note how many such books come from a compilation of papers presented at a given conference, and that this book does not follow that pattern. “We invited contributors to tender individual or comparative case study analyses that explain why events and processes in science happen the way they do” (Frickel & Moore, 2006, p. vii).

Referenced case studies include an examination of how social and political ideas shape how science is approached, and which scientific questions are examined. Likewise, there are examples showing how scientific work can influence political and social thought. Case studies include agricultural, biomedical research, alternative approaches to science, scientific consensus, ethics and training, political movements on specific diseases, and the list continues.

The ’creation’ or ‘discovery’ of scientific ‘facts’ is fraught with myriad decisions made by individuals and groups of people. Despite the assumed objectivity of the scientific approach, in reality the larger human world in which all scientists live plays an important role in what gets examined and how reliable the findings might be. Facts tend to be established through consensus, but consensus does not guarantee information is completely factual. The tensions among funding, policy, process, and priority are real as evidenced in the ideas and case studies offered in this book. What makes the ideas presented is simply that this is a later version of an earlier work by sociologist Stuart Blume. The earlier version from 1974 is titled Toward a Political Sociology of Science. As quoted by Frickel and Moore, the intent of that book was to offer an analysis “founded upon the assumption that the social institution of modern science is essentially political” (Frickel & Moore, 2006, p. 3). The motivation to update the ideas of the Blume book is that “the interconnections among the institutions he examined in deriving that claim have since undergone extensive transformation” (Frickel & Moore, 2006, p. 4).