Beach Haven

Bibliography
​Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Translated by Mark Ritter. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Washington DC: Sage.

Review by Michael Beach

In this book, Ulrich Beck weighs in on ‘modernity’. There are camps that say we have not become ‘modern’ yet. Others are proponents of modernism. Still others argue in favor of Western civilization in terms of post-modernism. Beck states his intent. “This book is an attempt to track down the word ‘post’, alternately called ‘late’ or ‘trans’” (Beck 1992, 9). He makes it clear his point of reference is modernism and modernist perspectives on risk.

In this work, Beck tackles risk as it relates to wealth distribution, politics, class, the family, institution, and various kinds of standards to name a few. He finishes up with an important section on what he calls 'reflexive modernization'. For those who espouse this framework, rather than defining crumbling tradition as post-modern, they argue the rise of new traditions and institutions establishing a new modernism. For example, national level definitions are giving way to ideas such as globalization. New modernity advocates support more independence as divorce rates rise. They advocate for less dependence on religion and other traditional forms of social construct. Ulrich Beck is looking at how views on risk are shifting along with these social changes.  

In the end, Beck looks at science. In a chapter titled Science beyond Truth and Enlightenment he makes the case that risk views depend on “scientific and social construction” (Beck 1992, 155). He claims “science is one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of solutions to risks” (Ibid.). He then offers four theses on scientization. Sociologists studying science have argued over definitions of scientization. To what degree of faith does one put into science as compared to other forms of knowledge creation? Lesser dependence on social factors in determining ‘reality’ increases dependence on science. Like many sociologist, I question total dependence on science. So does Beck, but he is less concerned about the degree of dependence on science, and more concerned with how the degree of scientization influences views on risk.

Beck’s comparisons between classic and reflexive views of modernism contribute to shifting views on risk. Views of both modernism and risk are not monolith. In the world of Venn charts, both views exist together, and individuals may accept both depending on their participation in different communities. For example, in the world of project management or engineering, risk is often associated with negative impacts to desired outcomes. There are actuarial spreadsheet approaches to calculate probability and impact of any given potential risk. These same practitioners may view social risk in their non-work lives more reflexively, accepting subjective meanings over numerical ones. Beck explores many such issues, but always within the framework of varying definitions of modernity.

Bibliography
​Guston, David H., and Kenneth Keniston, . 1994. The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press.
 
Review by Michael Beach

This book includes multiple authors. Guston and Keniston are the editors. Each chapter examines some aspect of the relationship between scientific research and government funding sources. The classic challenge for academics is determining research targets. They can range from general so-called ‘basic’ science topics to very specific ways of employing science and technology. Although the generalized idea of scientists desire for unfettered research agenda and the narrow outcomes preferred by funders can be true, it is a very simplistic description. Many researchers are motivated by the financial and prestige benefits of patented discoveries. Also, there are funders more interested in general science than in marketable inventions. Another consideration is the widespread establishment of academic institutes associated with universities that act as both research facilities and business incubators.

Among the considerations some of the authors approach includes the idea of trust. Value-based words such as trust, integrity, and accountability are common in the articles. Actors most generally defined are researchers of various sorts, government and business representatives, and differing descriptions of ‘the public’. What motivates the funders? What motivates the researcher? What role do members of the public play?

The best way I can think of to share the flavor of perspectives is to list the chapter titles. They include - The Social Contract for Science; Universities, the Public, and the Government: The State of the Partnership; On Doing One’s Damnedest: The Evolution of Trust in Scientific Findings; Integrity and Accountability in Research; The Public Face of Science: What Can We Learn from Disputes?; How Large an R&D Enterprise?; Views from the Benches: Funding Biomedical Research and the Physical Sciences; Financing Science after the Cold War; Indirect Costs and the Government-University Partnership; Research in U.S. Universities in a Technologically Competitive World; Constructive Responses to the Changing Social Context of University-Government Relations.

As you can see, there are plenty of meaty topics here. In addition to the language of social values and scientific research, many authors cover aspects of sustainable business to help justify funding and research decisions. 
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Bibliography
​Tallbear, Kim. 2013. Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press.
 
Review by Michael Beach

Kim Tallbear is one of my favorite authors related to my studies in science, technology, and society (STS). The title of this work is self-explanatory, but the topics she covered are varied, and certainly explores ideas new to me.

One of overarching themes relates to how human test material such as blood samples have been used in the past in ways not agreed to by the subjects. Often banks of samples and data are sold to companies that develop treatments or further databases that yield not only medical findings, but revenues that come with them.

Tallbear also looks at the accuracy of DNA testing to find one’s ancestry. Such services have become popular in the private sector. There are many reasons to hold such findings suspect, and Tallbear reviews some of the technical issues. In terms of Native Americans, many of the issues are more social than technical. For example, there are specific government benefits for people who can document a native ancestry. Likewise, there is risk to those who claim native heritage when DNA tests don’t support their claim. Another difficulty the author has with native DNA testing is how many people claim specific tribal affiliation based on results. In reality, tribes intermingled so much through economic and warfare activity that it is difficult at best to narrow DNA categories in this way.

The problematic aspects Tallbear raises about DNA testing can be more generalized in two area as she does. The first happens when science and business are tied to each other. She points to the example of the genographic project (mapping the human gene structure) and ‘the business of research and representation’. Others have broached how science represents ‘facts’. Ian Hacking looks at the same issues from a philosophical perspective. He refers to the issues as ‘representing and intervening’. Likewise, Sheila Jasanoff created an entire framework that includes the idea of ‘controlling narratives’.

Tallbear finishes with a look at governance. Who can decide what’s appropriate use and language? Once collected, who owns human genetic tissue? She shares other complicating questions that are still unanswered. Even with modernized legal documents about what sort of rights research subjects cede when they sign a specific document, court cases continue. For example, if a company purchases data or samples from an academic study, then creates large revenues from that resource, are donors entitled to some of it? What part does race play in subject selection? How do scientists define a specific narrow population? How much isolation is required, or intermixing is acceptable, to make the samples be representative of a specific population? As the reader might imagine, such questions can continue. These are ethical concerns for scientists, and often cause ‘native’ people to be unwilling to trust them.
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Bibliography
Price, Don K. 1965. The Scientific Estate. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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For Don Price, there was a shift in America. The original philosophy characterized by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. He says there are two main ‘articles of faith’ concerning progress. The first concerns material benefits which “lead society to support the advancement of science and technology” (Price 1965, 1). The other basic belief asserts that advancement in science “would lead society toward desirable purposes, including political freedom” (Ibid.). Price goes on to speak of negative effects of science and technology such as the dust bowl, atomic bombs, and the great depression, all of which were at least influenced by technological and scientific decisions.

“So we are about to reach the point when both scientists and politicians begin to worry not merely about specific issues, but about the theoretical status of science in our political and constitutional system” (Price 1965, 4). Price refers to a government report by Vanevar Bush titled Science, the Endless Frontier. I’ve reviewed that document in the past along with several books critical of it. Price’s overarching theme is that science is intertwined with politics. Not only is there such a concept like political science, but also political issues have some sort of scientific perspective. If in no other way, sociology is a form of science that looks at how social issues and movements form and function. Noting such scientific fields such as physics and genetics, Price makes scientific revolution has more effect on political institutions than the industrial revolution. Here are three specific statements he makes that the rest of the book is based on.

• The scientific revolution is moving the public and private sectors closer together.
• The scientific revolution is bringing a new order of complexity into the administration of public affairs.
• The scientific revolution is upsetting our system of checks and balances.

Essentially, Don Price argues that economic and political power have become so close that he calls them ‘fused’. He also takes the position that both forms of power are inseparable with scientific change.
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Bibliography
​Bloor, David. 1991. Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
This work by David Bloor repasses the strong program of sociology and the creation of knowledge. He was a proponent of a framework called the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The strong program suggests that technological advancements are primarily a function of social factors. The alternative, the weak program, doesn’t go so far, but looks at failed technologies and asserts social factors leading to their demise. After making a number of SSK arguments, Bloor looks at mathematics as an example. From the wisdom of the crowds example of ox-weight estimation, to the arguments against crow-sourcing for understanding the world, Bloor shares chapters on ‘naturalistic’ math followed by asking if there can be ‘alternative’ math.

For Bloor, and other proponents of SSK, naturalistic views are partial and don’t go far enough. Over time, other philosophers of science have pointed to Bloor’s own argument vulnerabilities in more or less ignoring technological and scientific effects on society. He admits there is some influence, but describes the influence seemingly like a form of feedback, but not so much as a changing factor. SSK leans away from technological determinism as have many other philosophical frameworks. Perhaps David Bloor and the school of SSK takes that leaning away too far. One argument he makes relates to symmetry. In this specific definition, all ideas should be approach as having equal weight until proven different. He argues “Our everyday attitudes are practical and evaluative, and evaluations are by their nature asymmetrical” (Bloor 1991, 175). Bloor shares examples of other philosophers inducing other forms of symmetry. Bloor’s position of practicality and ‘common sense’ is part of his justification of asymmetry between social influence on technology as opposed to technological influence on society. 
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Bibliography
​Lampland, Martha, and Susan Leigh Star, . 2009. Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying, and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
 
Reviewed by Michael Beach

Convention is the word of this book. The various chapter authors consider different standards of measurement we tend to take for granted. How did we choose one length, or weight, or electrical measurement over another? In fact, standards are still not really standard. Ask anyone who totes along an electrical plug converter when they travel internationally.

One area I found surprising is the chapter by Steven Epstein that relates to the ‘standard human’. I had not idea, but when dealing with medical research or treatment the world of health has set categories of humans. In reality, we are each different and are part of a mix and continuum of humanity, each with unique DNA. No one prognosis or treatment is best for all, so the medical community sort of does it work considering clumps of humans to get the symptoms and treatments mostly right most of the time.

There are a few standards examples reviewed from my profession, including metadata and ASCII definitions. One of the jokes in the industry of communications technology is that standards are so helpful because there are so many to choose from. The implication being that with so many different standards to select from, there really isn’t a ‘standard’.
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Bibliography
​Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Review by Michael Beach

Bruno Latour, among other things, was a French sociologist of science. This specific work was originally published in French in 1991. In the field of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) he is among the canonical authors. Depending on one’s philosophical bent, society, at least western society, finds itself in either a modernist or post-modernist world. The basic argument of Latour, as the title hints, is that neither is true. We are not modern in the sociological sense, and having never been so, we are also not post-modern.

Latour shares many definitions that have surfaced in explaining modernism. Latour points to the pattern in such definitions as comparative between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’. In this approach there is a winner and loser as modern supplants ancient. He argues, however, such arguments don’t reveal whether the new defeats the old or if it just brings past revolution “to fruition” (Latour 1993, 10). One aim of this work is to take on “the task of studying scientists and politicians in tandem since no central vantage point has seemed to exist” (Latour 1993, 13). Modernism can be looked at in many ways. Latour considers art, architecture, and scientific process among others. For Latour, modernism creates a dividing line between “the natural world and the social world” (Ibid.).

In this work, the author examines a famous debate between ‘natural philosophers’ such as Thomas Hobbes, and the ‘empiricists’ like Robert Boyle. The argument puts Hobbes on one side in which the world is defined through thought experiment and the theoretical. On the other side, Boyles defines science as finding truth about the natural world through planned experiments. At the heart of the debate is which brings us closer to truth. Modernism in science looks to support empiricism over philosophy. For Latour, that leaves out the influence that each has on each other. For example, experiments are formulated and carried out based on theories and assumptions constructed over time, and theories and assumptions are shaped by former experiments.

Bruno Latour is arguing for symmetry over asymmetry. “When Georges Canguilhem distinguishes scientific ideologies from true sciences, he asserts not only that it is impossible to study Darwin – the scientist – and Diderot – the ideologue – in the same terms, but that it must be impossible to lump them together” (Latour 1993, 92). Latour then argues for symmetry between the two approaches arguing that they are inextricably connected.  On page 135 is a table arguing what parts of both modernist and post-modernist approaches should be maintained, and which rejected, in order to describe a symmetrical approach that Latour argues that is more reflective of how the social and the scientific actually interact with each other to form our current scientific and technologically influenced world.
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References
​Hess, David J. 2016. Undone Science: Social Movements, Mobilized Publics, and Industrial Transitions. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.

Review by Michael Beach

In this work, David J. Hess looks at controversial issues that involve “complex scientific and technological issues that can provoke sharp divisions in public opinion” (Hess 2016, 1). As a way to examine the role of scientific and technological expertise Hess includes specific topics to include climate change, industrial pollution, nanomaterials, technologies of surveillance, and products of molecular biology. It’s safe to say these topics are both ongoing and controversial. Although he looks at the political issues themselves, the point of the work is to look at epistemological perspectives by and about scientists and technologists involved in these specific focus areas.

One example of an area Hess examines is depicted in the chapter 3 title; “The Politics of Meaning: From Frames to Design Conflicts” (Hess 2016, 79). The controversial topics noted above are not the focus of this chapter so much as the setting. The focus is on how researchers tend to frame the arguments and issues that need attention, and the cultural factors that influence their analysis. How does one create an analysis (breaking down ideas into parts) then move towards a meaningful synthesis (understanding the way the parts interact)? Designing an approach to both analysis and synthesis is where many human factors can cause variation in approach that also cause variation in artifacts produced in the process. This variable process is what causes many of us who are not experts in a given controversial topic such as climate change to put stock in one political position or another using ‘science’ as one of our arguments in favor of a given position. An example Hess shares relates to high emissions by buses. The bus depots that have the highest pollution emission concentrations tend to be in lower-income parts of cities. He gives examples of studies conducted in specific cities that linked income with bus depot locations. These studies further linked low-income neighborhoods with predominantly African American residents. Yet, one needs to examine the details about bus usage, historical demographic changes in neighborhoods, and other similar factors. “More generally, the analysis of race and design in the urban transit system suggest a need for methodological caution” (Hess 2016, 91). Studies have often suffered criticism in the process of going from the general the specific (analysis), then applying the specific to the general (synthesis). Humans are making decisions all along the process of what to examine and what to ignore in collecting data. Then humans are making decisions all along the process of which variables and data are relevant and which are not. In the language of statistical analysis, what information is statistically significant, and how does one define statistically significant? How much variability in data is acceptable to call something ‘significant’? The subjectivity is ultimately what has led to an erosion of confidence by some in scientific expertise. 
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References
Ezrahi, Yaron. 1990. The Descent of Icarus: Sceince and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

​Review by Michael Beach

The author has looked at the cross-section of science and politics since the 1960s. In this work, Yaron Ezrahi considers the role of scientific expertise in the policy process within modern ‘liberal-democratic’ states. He shares examples of the ascension of science as an authoritative voice in coming to ‘objective’ conclusions. Over time, other factors came to have as much or more influence in policy. Since experts of similar credential don’t always agree, and some change their perspective over time, public policy makers have come to view expertise as one area of consideration when forming public policy, not so much as the area of consideration. The lowering of scientific authority from preeminence to that of one more voice of many is its descension. Science is more generally understood to have both objective and subjective components, often with ‘dueling experts’ on opposite sides of a policy question.

Ezrahi examines both political process and its relationship with scientific process. The work is divided into three sections. The first examines the political functions of science. It is followed by a look at dilemmas that arise between private persons and public actions. This includes those who act as scientific experts, but also those who create policy, and the rest of us who vote in a democratic society. The final section takes deep dive into effects caused by the privatization of science in the United States specifically.

One interesting thread for me as a reader was the author’s look at machines as a metaphor in scientific and policy processes. For example, machines can be viewed as helpful and positive, or out of control. In the first, we have influence and benefit from mechanistic processes. They create a fair and equal environment. In the second, those not directly inside the machine are powerless and fall victim to its seemingly mindless path. Where one falls in the machine metaphor as benevolent or apocalyptic, depends a great deal on the specific country or culture with which one is surrounded. 
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Bibliography
​Daston, Lorraine, and Gregg Mitman, . 2005. Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Antrhopomorphism. New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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This is a collection of articles (chapters) from multiple authors. Each chapter focuses on some aspect of how humans project themselves onto animals. For example, many fairy tales and Saturday morning cartoon characters include animals that talk and feel like humans. Some authors do the opposite, such as the chapter by Wendy Doniger in which she explores the idea that humans can be more bestial than beasts. Paul S. White looks at the use of animals in scientific experimentation during the age of Victorian Britain.

The list goes on. Authors tackle topics including evolutionary biology, psychology, human-pet relationships, digital beasts, media, politics, and conversation. Several chapters look into human-animal relationships from a scientific perspective, either their use in science, or scientific evaluation of the human in some connected way. These chapters are the main motivation for my reading the book as a part of my PhD program, but the rest of the perspectives are worth the read.

One example of a specific approach includes a study of “The Family that Live with Elephants” (Daston and Mitman 2005, 177). In this section, Gregg Mitman considers communications between the elephants and the human family that cares for them. The human father and daughter in particular discuss actions and noises the pachyderms make to express ideas. The humans ponder how subjective the elephant thoughts are, and not just simple one-word ideas. In a discussion about objective and subjective human evaluation of elephant language, the daughter eventually asserts, “But it’s HUMAN and subjective. They decide which bits of animal behavior to be objective about by consulting human subjective experience. Didn’t you say that anthropomorphism is a bad thing?” To which her father answers, “Yes – but they do try to be not human” (Ibid.).
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