Beach Haven

In the making of scientific knowledge Thomas Kuhn would say something seems true until something else seems truer. Karl Popper would say something seems true until it isn’t. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar would say something seems true until it doesn’t seem true

In a number of publications, Kuhn explained the growth of scientific knowledge in the form a paradigm. A new way of explaining the physical world grows in popularity. It does so because the gist of the big idea better explains a particular set of conundrums than the previous big idea that had been accepted. The way a new paradigm becomes generally accepted happens as the previous paradigm that seemed to answer well enough, over time, doesn’t answer for all the questions scientists come up with on a given topic. This doesn’t happen right away. Scientists dedicate much effort and time into supporting the established paradigm. Eventually observations begin to raise questions that the established theories can’t answer. At some point some scientist or scientific group (usually newer, younger scientists less committed to the theories of the previous generation) begin to form new ideas to better satisfy the questions not answered by established science. The result is a paradigm shift, a new big theory, and the cycle repeats itself.

In sharing this approach to changing scientific knowledge, Kuhn references Popper. The perspective of the referred to theorist purports the concept of the null-hypothesis. Popper argued that evidence leads to a theory. The theory inspires more experimentation and debate. Eventually the debate leads to attempts to disprove a theory experimentally in the face of growing supportive evidence. With the null-hypothesis approach a scientists looks for at least one way in which the accepted theory does not apply. Once a theory is not true in at least one case, then it is not true.

Latour and Woolgar share works in which they review how some scientific ideas become accepted with or without supporting empirical data. They examine artifacts in the form of scientific journals. Theories gain popularity based on documented evidence (not necessarily proof) as written and published. Popularity of scientific ideas may have as much to do with how articles are written, or the reputation of the journal, authoring scientist, or institution an authoring scientist belongs to, than any actual evidence. There are even specific types of statements used in articles that make the shared ideas more or less likely to be successfully believed by scientific readers. It is entirely possible for a theory to be accepted or rejected by the bulk of the greater scientific society based on the way articles for and against are written. Latour and Woolgar refer to the approach of theory adoption by journal article creation as ‘literary inscription’. It seems scientists, like the rest of us, can be more or less convincing, and more or less convinced, based on subjective factors as much as supposedly objective data.

All of these beliefs about how scientific knowledge changes bring into question if supposed ‘growth’ or ‘advancement’ are fit descriptors. Latour and Woolgar argue ‘fact’ and literary inscription may have congruence, but are not necessarily co-constructive. Their assessment clearly argues in favor of social factors as a guiding influence on what is accepted by the scientific community. Popper argues it is social factors that incentivize scientific torpedoing of theories. Kuhn supports the idea that social factors influence those scientists that adopt and support an established paradigm; an older generation more invested in the old paradigm. Likewise those who seek a new paradigm are influenced by social factors as well; a drive to be the new leaders of scientific industry thought.

Really this entry could be called Woolgar on MacKenzie on Yule vs. Pearson. Steve Woolgar wrote a critique of a paper published by Donald MacKenzie. MacKenzie's paper was titled Statistical Theory and Social Interests: A Case-Study. In part MacKenzie used an argument between to statistical theorists named George Udny Yule and Karl Pearson to explain how scientists are socially influenced both in their choice of study, their approach to the study, and the conclusions drawn in their study.  Woolgar's paper was titled Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science. 

Just as histories may reflect the perspective of historians as much (or more) as they reflect reality, so to, argues Woolgar, is the case of ‘interests’ defining the scientific ‘acts’ of scientists.

Woolgar uses MacKenzie’s review of the differing statistical theories of Pearce and Yule to make his points, though he eludes to an entire line of “Case Studies of Interests”. Woolgar shares a list of six very specific assumptions or approaches of analysts like MacKenzie who argue in favor of a causal relationship between the interests of a scientist and the eventual acts, or artifacts, produced by them. 

Within the assumptions of some case study reviewers there is a belief that scientific action is expressive of concomitant interests. Woolgar argues that in case studies, reviewers such as MacKenzie inevitably make the point that the scientific actions are expressive of these concomitant interests. He (Woolgar) explains that these coexisting phenomena do not necessarily make either causal of the other. He further argues that the interests derived by scientific actions are more likely derived by the interpretation of the analysts themselves.

As an example, Woolgar shows how MacKenzie attributes an interest in furthering the adoption of statistical theories of correlation and regression to the motivating factor of Pearson’s development of the rT and C concepts. Later MacKenzie adds a focus on analogy as a motivating factor (interest) of Pearson.  Woolgar essentially asks if piling on interests (motivations) is a way for MacKenzie to give credence to his interests-cause-actions argument. Woolgar shows how those attempting to show a cause-and-effect relationship between interests and acts must first adopt a belief that the interest and the act are independent of each other. He then shows that one could argue as easily that the act brings about the interest as the other way around. This line of thinking risks a certain circularity of thought that questions the linear argument of analysts like MacKenzie. Woolgar also points out that neither interest nor act may be causal of the other.

The idea that an analyst is completely objective in finding the route-cause interests is another of the suppositions Woolgar questions. MacKenzie argues independence of the interests from the acts to be able to assert one causing the other. By documenting a series of acts that form a pattern, the analyst is able to discover the route interest, or so goes the line of thinking. Woolgar argues that any number of potential motivations could explain a pattern of actions so it would be difficult at best to discover the specific motivation(s) if not explicitly documented by the scientist being studied.  The person analyzing potential interests are themselves influenced by their own interests as they attempt to pare down the list of candidate motivations.

If Woolgar takes issue with interests leading to acts, he accidentally supports the view by using his argument about analysts‘ interests leading to their acts (their analyses). He himself is attempting to discover motivation of the analysts of motivation. Another weak point of Woolgar’s perspective is in his criticism of MacKenzie’s generalization of supporting documentation by Pearson and Yule by simply stating they each supply more information about their interests in other documents. Woolgar argues that by generalizing these other works, and not giving any idea what the other works are, or even how many of them exist, MacKenzie is attempting to bolster his argument without actually giving evidence. 

If necessity is the mother of invention, then Boris Hessen stretches the proverb to say that economic goals are the mother of necessity, which is the mother of invention, which is the mother of basic science. His argument stems from a few practical examples. It is juxtaposed to other beliefs that once some basic scientific discovery is made, then some specific applications are invented from the new knowledge, which are later put to economic use. Hessen support the opposite view.

As the industrial revolution encouraged increased division of labor, factory owners were looking for ways to increase productivity. Hessen’s specific example was for a cloth weaving spinning jenny. The early models were powered by hand, then by water. Both methods had serious limitations. The goal was to allow the device to be operated “without fingers.” The answer seemed to be in the steam engine which was originally designed for work in the mining industry. The hope was to make it such that a steam engine could be more generically applied to other industrial uses as a “universal motor.”

The engine proved practical, but another issue arose in the increased need (read increased cost) for large amounts of fuel to heat water into steam sufficient to power the weaving factories ‘round-the-clock. This is yet another economic issue that required thought. Enter Nicolas Carnot looking to improved efficiency of the steam engines to increase capacity or lower required fuel. He asked the basic question whether power from steam heat was unbounded. He wanted to know if it were possible to generate steam power with no upper limit at a higher rate than the additional fuel used to increase the required heat. In his approaches to determine the “coefficient of profitable activity” he also managed to establish the foundation of a new scientific discipline within physics known as thermodynamics. Based on Carnot’s efforts other scientists (e.g. Kelvin and Clausius) were eventually able to define the second law of thermodynamics. In this example Hessen depicts these events as a trajectory from a set of economic goals, to employment of an invention, to discovery of a new form of science.

Hessen also points to another way the invention of the steam engine encouraged basic science. Every mechanical invention needs a motive power, a transmission mechanism of that power, and an executing instrument driven by the transmission mechanism. The study of the forms of motion of, and efficiency in, the steam engine led to more general studies of the motion of matter. Hessen specifically points to mechanics, heat, and eventually electricity. Similar to the eventuality of thermodynamics, study in each of these areas for practical application likewise generated new fields of investigation in basic science.

As each of these more and more specific areas of science developed, Hessen draws a correlation to Marxist principles of classification. He points to Friedrich Engels’ conception of “interconnection” and “hierarchy” of the movements of matter as symbolized in the order of various study disciplines within science being both interconnected and forming a hierarchy of social arrangement. Engels provided theories of conservation and conversion of energy based on a “materialistic conception of nature” akin to ideas espoused by Marx and Lenin. Hessen argues these Marxist ideas lead to an understanding of the “historical succession” of the development of the associated sciences of motion. The succession being yet another trajectory from economic goal, to practical invention, to scientific definition.