Brey, Philip. 2009. "Philosophy of Technology Meets Social Constructivism: A Shopper's Guide." Chap. 7 in Readings in the Philosophy of Technology, edited by David M. Kaplan, 98-111. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
In his ‘Shopper’s Guide’ approach to spelling out ways social constructivism could compliment the philosophy of technology, Philip Brey offers at least a partial answer to Langdon Winner. The latter had judged in previous writings that if one were to open the proverbial black box of Bruno Latour, one would find no tangible additions to philosophy by social constructivists. Winner argued this was because social constructivism harbored definitions that are too narrow in scope. To Brey, social constructivism does examine areas Winner claimed it was ignoring.
Philip Brey offers generalized descriptions of the ‘strong’ and ‘mild’ approaches of research (his shopper's guide). He agrees that the strict adherence to the symmetry principle in the strong program can inhibit some, but not all, philosophical supporting research. He claims the philosophy of technology is too abstract. It does not examine any particular technology or its impacts. Testable arguments within the philosophy of technology are often not supported by empirical evidence, he notes. Experiments and data derived through social constructivist research, Brey argues, can help philosophers of technology construct more realistic theories.
For Brey, artifacts are socially shaped, but also embody a script that can influence outcomes. Social constructivism, he argues, allows normative and evaluative philosophical analyses of technology and its impacts not otherwise possible. He does temper his argument stating, “these approaches, if valid, do suggest new directions for the philosophy of technology” (p. 108). Brey had suggested throughout the article that the proverbial black box was not empty as Winner suggested, but was filling up as social constructivist research expanded, and rigid adherence to the symmetry principle was vacillating. One could argue that this idea of adjustment to the symmetry principle results in something other than social constructivism. Brey weakens his argument by adding the caveat “if valid” to his closing statement.
The attached version of the reviewed article is from an alternate source.
In his ‘Shopper’s Guide’ approach to spelling out ways social constructivism could compliment the philosophy of technology, Philip Brey offers at least a partial answer to Langdon Winner. The latter had judged in previous writings that if one were to open the proverbial black box of Bruno Latour, one would find no tangible additions to philosophy by social constructivists. Winner argued this was because social constructivism harbored definitions that are too narrow in scope. To Brey, social constructivism does examine areas Winner claimed it was ignoring.
Philip Brey offers generalized descriptions of the ‘strong’ and ‘mild’ approaches of research (his shopper's guide). He agrees that the strict adherence to the symmetry principle in the strong program can inhibit some, but not all, philosophical supporting research. He claims the philosophy of technology is too abstract. It does not examine any particular technology or its impacts. Testable arguments within the philosophy of technology are often not supported by empirical evidence, he notes. Experiments and data derived through social constructivist research, Brey argues, can help philosophers of technology construct more realistic theories.
For Brey, artifacts are socially shaped, but also embody a script that can influence outcomes. Social constructivism, he argues, allows normative and evaluative philosophical analyses of technology and its impacts not otherwise possible. He does temper his argument stating, “these approaches, if valid, do suggest new directions for the philosophy of technology” (p. 108). Brey had suggested throughout the article that the proverbial black box was not empty as Winner suggested, but was filling up as social constructivist research expanded, and rigid adherence to the symmetry principle was vacillating. One could argue that this idea of adjustment to the symmetry principle results in something other than social constructivism. Brey weakens his argument by adding the caveat “if valid” to his closing statement.
The attached version of the reviewed article is from an alternate source.
| brey_-_shoppers_guide.pdf |
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