Below is a synthesis short writing given at the end of a class I took on Philosophy of Science and Technology:
Argumentative Claim:
Truth exists, but our understanding of it is an approximation.
Justification:
Newton conjectured existence of the ‘all-pervading aether’ (Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 254). Hacking shows how for centuries many scientists held the existence of the substance. With this basic premise they were able to explain many phenomena, at least in part. The idea more or less gave up the ghost when Einstein’s relativity was generally adopted by the scientific community. That didn’t happen immediately. Interestingly, calculation such as those published by Maxwell were referenced by both Newtonians and Einstein. This points to Hacking’s idea that calculation acts as a bridge between speculation and experiment.
Then why did most scientists make the shift from Newton to Einstein? Thomas Kuhn would argue either could be justified as a paradigm suggesting relativity would eventually be supplanted by something newer, not necessarily truer. If one ascribes to Kuhn’s argument taken to extreme, then the existence of truth itself is in question. Kuhn might be accused of “ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Timothy 3:7, New Testament).
Describing skepticism, Baggini and Fosl point to a need for ‘criterion of truth’ (The Philosopher's Toolkit, 126). One could make the argument that such an approach makes truth relative to criteria. Who decides which criteria matter? Calculation and experimentation ultimately lead to a level of probability of truth. Hacking argues experiments fill theoretical blanks (Representing and Intervening, 239). That only improves theoretical probability, what Nancy Cartwright calls an approximation of truth (Representing and Intervening, 218).
I would argue one must adopt one’s own criteria for truth. These criteria are what might be considered accepted basic principles. To maintain belief in a principle such as truth exists independent of man’s discovery or invention, a principle I personally hold, one must consider alternatives that introduce some level of doubt. Alternatives will have some logic, and likely some level of experimentation. To maintain confidence in the basic principle requires at least a rough understanding of the probabilistic comparison of the conflicting ideas, and a willingness to adjust if the probability of the alternate rises in comparison over time. Despite shifting probabilities, one must remember that either or both alternative principles may be wrong, and be comfortable living with some level of doubt.
Argumentative Claim:
Truth exists, but our understanding of it is an approximation.
Justification:
Newton conjectured existence of the ‘all-pervading aether’ (Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 254). Hacking shows how for centuries many scientists held the existence of the substance. With this basic premise they were able to explain many phenomena, at least in part. The idea more or less gave up the ghost when Einstein’s relativity was generally adopted by the scientific community. That didn’t happen immediately. Interestingly, calculation such as those published by Maxwell were referenced by both Newtonians and Einstein. This points to Hacking’s idea that calculation acts as a bridge between speculation and experiment.
Then why did most scientists make the shift from Newton to Einstein? Thomas Kuhn would argue either could be justified as a paradigm suggesting relativity would eventually be supplanted by something newer, not necessarily truer. If one ascribes to Kuhn’s argument taken to extreme, then the existence of truth itself is in question. Kuhn might be accused of “ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Timothy 3:7, New Testament).
Describing skepticism, Baggini and Fosl point to a need for ‘criterion of truth’ (The Philosopher's Toolkit, 126). One could make the argument that such an approach makes truth relative to criteria. Who decides which criteria matter? Calculation and experimentation ultimately lead to a level of probability of truth. Hacking argues experiments fill theoretical blanks (Representing and Intervening, 239). That only improves theoretical probability, what Nancy Cartwright calls an approximation of truth (Representing and Intervening, 218).
I would argue one must adopt one’s own criteria for truth. These criteria are what might be considered accepted basic principles. To maintain belief in a principle such as truth exists independent of man’s discovery or invention, a principle I personally hold, one must consider alternatives that introduce some level of doubt. Alternatives will have some logic, and likely some level of experimentation. To maintain confidence in the basic principle requires at least a rough understanding of the probabilistic comparison of the conflicting ideas, and a willingness to adjust if the probability of the alternate rises in comparison over time. Despite shifting probabilities, one must remember that either or both alternative principles may be wrong, and be comfortable living with some level of doubt.
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