Beach Haven

Marcuse, Herbert. 2009. "The New Forms of Control." In Readings in the Philosophy of Technology, edited by David M. Kaplan, 34-42. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
 
Review by Michael Beach

This article was shared in the aggregate referenced book, but is really the first chapter of a book written by Harbert Marcuse titled One-Dimensional Man. In the Marcuse reading The New Forms of Control, he argues, among other things, that use of mass media is one technological mechanism intended to align inner-dimension personal needs with outer-dimension societal (repressive) needs. The higher the personal level of indoctrination, the more the standards of priority align. Marcuse uses this idea of a societal need to indoctrinate as an implication of the two-dimensional person. ‘Society’ uses technology such as mass media to bring individual needs toward a goal of mimesis. When that societal goal is reached, the individual is now really one-dimensional. There is no longer any difference between personal or societal needs as expressed through technology adoption.

Marcuse wrote this in 1964. Mass media then was quite different from today. Television and radio broadcast channels, as well as newspapers and magazines, were essentially the communication technologies of the day. Marcuse focuses primarily on broadcast media, rightfully for the time in that these were the primary information and entertainment sources of most people, at least in many western cultures. Since then media have fractionalized considerably. One can make the argument that narrowcast two-way media is having the opposite effect as Marcuse depicts. As people have ever more choices, and increasing control over the sources they rely on for information, the number of ‘societies’ available through technical means has grown. Membership in any one society or culture has decreased. Many people even find themselves in multiple cultures simultaneously. Mistrust grows by way of technology in those cultures (societies) to which one chooses not to belong. Maybe this still makes each person one-dimensional as Marcuse implies. Does it also mean each ever-more-specialized society now adjusts its needs to match individuals in order to have enough ‘membership’ in order to exist? Is it the society that becomes more one-dimensional?

The attachment is of the specific reference above, but is the entire work. This article only reviews chapter 1. 

Heidegger, Martin. 2009. "The Question Concerning Technology." In Readings in the Philosophy          of Technology, edited by David M. Kaplan, 9-24. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto,                      Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
 
Review by Michael Beach

In this seminal article on the topic of the philosophy of technology, Martin Heidegger seeks to define the essence of technology. He approaches this subject through a series of interconnected vocabulary. The essence, he says, is enframing which he defines as a destining or revealing. Other words in the circular argument include calling-forth, ordering, unconcealment, and setting-upon. In one sense, nature is a resource, a standing-reserve. Heidegger speaks further of a danger to ‘man’. If one is not careful, he says, humankind becomes a force of ordering up nature’s standing-reserve. If, then, man is only in the role of ordering up reserves in order to unconceal (reveal) technology, then man also becomes a standing-reserve in the destining of nature as technology. This risk Heidegger defines as danger, but notes that in that very danger man can find the saving power of recognizing the true essence of technology. To Heidegger, the highest dignity of man is in keeping watch over unconcealment of all nature and technology coming to presence.

Martin Heidegger is a foundational author in this branch of philosophy. All subsequent practitioners are forced to address his ideas. Historically, his works were published in the early 20th century. Heideggarians are forced to also consider his role in the Nazi regime of Hitler’s Germany. His arguments help to see technology beyond the simple ideas of technology-as-applied-science, or as human attempts to alter the natural world. For Heidegger, there is a difference between technology that sets nature in order such as subsistence farming, and technology that sets-upon nature such as coal mining. The former simply uses nature more or less as it is to benefit man. The latter increases nature, or changes natural processes. In the coal example, the sun changes energy into coal. Man then extracts the coal, distributes it, and then removes the heat to create other kinds of energy such as electricity. That energy is further distributed, and is again converted into heat, or mechanical energy for yet other uses, and so on.

One weakness of Heidegger’s argument is its circularity. Often he uses words to define other words in a chain which eventually is used to help define the words he used to start the definition chain. Some of this struggle comes from his use of Greek words that he explains in his original text written in German, then later translated into English for the version this review is concerned with. 

The posted pdf version of this article is from a source different from the opening reference.

For the mid-term this semester we selected two topics from among six. I wrote these in reverse order. The first to appear was actually the second I wrote, and was rushed in the process. I think it shows. 

Below is a synthesis short writing given at the end of a class I took on Philosophy of Science and Technology: 

Argumentative Claim:

Truth exists, but our understanding of it is an approximation.

Justification:

Newton conjectured existence of the ‘all-pervading aether’ (Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 254). Hacking shows how for centuries many scientists held the existence of the substance. With this basic premise they were able to explain many phenomena, at least in part. The idea more or less gave up the ghost when Einstein’s relativity was generally adopted by the scientific community. That didn’t happen immediately. Interestingly, calculation such as those published by Maxwell were referenced by both Newtonians and Einstein. This points to Hacking’s idea that calculation acts as a bridge between speculation and experiment.

Then why did most scientists make the shift from Newton to Einstein? Thomas Kuhn would argue either could be justified as a paradigm suggesting relativity would eventually be supplanted by something newer, not necessarily truer. If one ascribes to Kuhn’s argument taken to extreme, then the existence of truth itself is in question. Kuhn might be accused of “ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Timothy 3:7, New Testament).

Describing skepticism, Baggini and Fosl point to a need for ‘criterion of truth’ (The Philosopher's Toolkit, 126). One could make the argument that such an approach makes truth relative to criteria. Who decides which criteria matter? Calculation and experimentation ultimately lead to a level of probability of truth.  Hacking argues experiments fill theoretical blanks (Representing and Intervening, 239). That only improves theoretical probability, what Nancy Cartwright calls an approximation of truth (Representing and Intervening, 218).
​

I would argue one must adopt one’s own criteria for truth. These criteria are what might be considered accepted basic principles. To maintain belief in a principle such as truth exists independent of man’s discovery or invention, a principle I personally hold, one must consider alternatives that introduce some level of doubt. Alternatives will have some logic, and likely some level of experimentation. To maintain confidence in the basic principle requires at least a rough understanding of the probabilistic comparison of the conflicting ideas, and a willingness to adjust if the probability of the alternate rises in comparison over time. Despite shifting probabilities, one must remember that either or both alternative principles may be wrong, and be comfortable living with some level of doubt.